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WHEN FEED IS DEEMED PAID
— by Neil E. Harl*
A major question in some farm operations on the cash
method of accounting is when payment is considered made
for purposes of income tax deductibility for feed and other
supplies.1 In particular, the issue is often whether anything
short of an actual cash payment will support an income tax
deduction.2
Basic rule
For taxpayers on the cash method of accounting,
amounts paid for feed or other supplies may properly be
deducted when "paid."3 The question is when amounts are
deemed "paid."
Promissory note as payment
It is well settled that a taxpayer on the cash method of
accounting who gives a promissory note as payment for
feed or other supplies is not entitled to an income tax
deduction even though the note is secured by collateral.4 By
contrast, a taxpayer who borrows money and uses the
borrowed funds to pay an obligation for which a deduction
is allowable (such as feed and other supplies) may claim an
income deduction.5 The income tax deduction may be
claimed when the borrowed funds are paid to the vendor for
the purchased items.6
The issuance of a promissory note or similar obligation
represents only a promise to pay.7 The payment required to
support an income tax deduction is the payment of cash or
its equivalent; the giving of a promissory note is not the
equivalent of cash for this purpose.8
Chapman v. United States
In a 1981 case, Chapman v. United States,9 The
taxpayers had deducted $30,000 for the cost of cattle feed to
a feedlot.  A cash payment of $15,000 had been paid with
the balance payable when the cattle were sold. At  that time,
the unpaid feed balance was to be paid before the rest of the
sale proceeds were paid to the taxpayer.  To secure the
ultimate payment for the feed, the taxpayer gave the feedlot
a promissory note for $15,000 and a secured letter of credit
for the same amount.10 Thus, of the $30,000 feed bill, the
taxpayers paid $15,000 and essentially gave a secured
promissory note for the balance. The letter of credit was
_____________________________________________________
*
 Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and
Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; member of the
Iowa Bar.
never drawn upon and expired by its own terms.
IRS disallowed the $15,000 amount that was not
represented by a cash payment.
The taxpayers argued that they should be entitled to a
deduction for the full $30,000. As for the $15,000 not paid
in cash, the taxpayers argued that they had paid the amount
with borrowed funds.11
The court denied a deduction except for the $15,000
paid in cash.12 The amount secured by the letter of credit
was viewed as analogous to a promissory note secured by
collateral.
 The taxpayers had argued that the letter of credit
arrangement was similar to a situation where a bank
certifies a check and this should be viewed as payment. The
court rejected that comparison and stated that a certified
check is a cash equivalent but a letter of credit "is similar to
a consumer credit card waiting to be used."13
In conclusion.
Various types of arrangements similar to secured
promissory notes and letters of credit are in use in feedlots
currently. In those situations, a feedlot customer would
generally not be entitled to an income tax deduction for feed
until the earlier of — (1) actual payment by the customer
for the feed or (2) application of proceeds from the sale of
cattle to payment of the unpaid feed balance.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law  § 28.05[5]
(1995); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.03[8]
(1995).
2 I.R.C. § 162(a). See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12(a).
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 461(a).
4 Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 140 (1931). See Helvering v.
Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940). See also Rev. Rul. 77-257,
1977-2 C.B. 174.
5 Rev. Rul. 77-257, 1977-2 C.B. 174.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Rev. Rul. 70-647, 1970-2 C.B. 38. See Helvering v.
Price, 309 U.S. 409 (1940) (question of whether
payment made in discharge of liability to bank was
effected by substituting new note for earlier note). See
also Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm’r, 429 U.S. 569
(1977) (secured promissory notes were not payment of
contributions to retirement plan).
9 527 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Minn. 1981).
18                                                                                                                                                                 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM). For information about ordering the Manual, see the last page of this issue.
10 Id. at 1054.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 1055.
13 Id.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
HOSTILE USE. The land involved was originally one
parcel but the owner divided the parcel into two equal
parcels and sold the west half first. The new owner (west
side owner) erected a fence on what the owner thought, as
informed by the real estate agent, was the property line but
which was actually 60 feet on to the owner’s property. The
owner did not otherwise improve the property and allowed
the real estate agent to pasture cattle on the property. The
east half of the property was purchased later with the fence
already in place; therefore, the new owners (east side
owners) also thought the fence was the actual boundary. The
east side owners also did not improve their property and
allowed the real estate agent to pasture horses on the
property, including the disputed strip. The only other
activity on the strip was watering by the sprinkler system by
the east side owners. A flood cut away much of the west
side property and carried away some of the fence and some
of the disputed strip.  The east side owners leased the house
to the real estate agent as a residence and for a ranch for the
agent’s cattle. The cattle were tethered because of the
broken fence.  The east side owners then sold their parcel to
the plaintiff through the same real estate agent, who
informed the plaintiff that the fence was the true boundary.
The plaintiff replaced the fence after the flood damage was
restored.  The west side parcel was then sold to the
defendant with the former west side owner taking a deed of
trust on the property.  Three years later, the defendant had a
survey done which finally showed that the fence was 60 feet
on the west parcel and the plaintiff filed a quiet title action
as to the defendant and as to the holder of the deed of trust.
Although the plaintiff had clearly adversely possessed the
disputed strip after their possession, the length of possession
was insufficient to acquire title by adverse possession;
therefore, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate adverse
possession by the previous possessors. The defendant
argued that because the real estate agent’s lease of the land
did not include using the land for cattle, the agent’s use of
the disputed strip could not be considered as adverse
possession by the previous owners. The court held that the
previous owners did not restrict the agent’s use of the land;
therefore, the agent’s use of the disputed strip to graze
tethered cattle was sufficient adverse possession to attribute
that possession to the previous owner and could be tacked
onto the plaintiff’s adverse possession. The court also held,
however, that the adverse possession did not include the
portion of the disputed strip which was washed away in the
flood, because no use of that portion was made by the agent
and the washed away area became open range visited by
cattle from several other ranches. The deed of trust holder
argued that the adverse possession did not apply to the lien
on the property. The court agreed that title by adverse
possession could not accrue against the lienholder because
the lien holder had no cause of action against the adverse
possessor until the debtor defaulted on the loan. Berryhill v.
Moore, 881 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS . Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor was involved in a suit against a
manufacturer of cattle feed for damages resulting from
defective feed. Prior to 90 days before filing for bankruptcy,
the debtor assigned to a creditor a portion of the anticipated
damages. The debtor received the damage award within the
90 days before filing for bankruptcy and the creditor
received the portion of the award before the bankruptcy case
commenced. The court held that the transfer to the creditor
was not avoidable as a preferential transfer because the
effective date of the transfer was the date the assignment of
the damage award was executed, not the date the award was
paid to the creditor. In re Wagner, 173 B.R. 916 (N.D.
Iowa 1994), aff’g, 144 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992).
ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor’s mother had
created an inter vivos trust with a one-third remainder for
the debtor. The mother died one month after the debtor filed
for Chapter 7 and the debtor became entitled to one-third of
the trust property. The debtor claimed the interest in the
trust as exempt under Section 541(a)(5)(A), arguing that the
trust property was not received “by bequest, devise or
inheritance.”  The court held that recent U.S. Supreme Court
and Second Circuit Court of Appeals rulings required a
“plain meaning” interpretation of Section 541 and that
receipt of property through a remainder interest in an inter
vivos trust was not receipt of property by bequest, devise or
inheritance.  However, the court held that the debtor’s
interest in the trust was estate property under Section
541(a)(1) which included all interests in property held by
the debtor. The holding is not clear as to whether the court
intended that all of the debtor’s share of the trust was
included or just the value of the remainder interest at the
time of the filing of the petition. In re Crandall, 173 B.R.
836 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor entered into
an installment contract to purchase a meat-processing
business, including real and personal property and goodwill.
The debtor received possession of all assets and the seller
agreed to satisfy all existing liens against the property and to
hold the debtor harmless for any liabilities which arose prior
to the sale. The seller retained title to the property until all
payments were made. The debtor initially filed a motion to
assume the contract but the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for payments only to the extent of the value of the
property, treating the contract as a security agreement. The
